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Abstract
This paper applies the framework of endogenous timing in games to mixed quantity
duopoly, wherein a private – domestic or foreign – ﬁrm competes with a public, welfare-
maximizing ﬁrm. We show that simultaneous play never emerges as a subgame-perfect
equilibrium of the extended game, in sharp contrast to private duopoly games. We provide
suﬃcient conditions for the emergence of public and/or private leadership equilibrium. In
all cases, private proﬁts and social welfare are higher than under the corresponding Cournot
equilibrium. From a methodological viewpoint we make extensive use of the basic results
from the theory of supermodular games in order to avoid common extraneous assumptions
such as concavity, existence and uniqueness of the diﬀerent equilibria, whenever possible.
Some policy implications are drawn, in particular those relating to the merits of privati-
zation.
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In several important markets public ﬁrms compete with a small number of private rivals. Ex-
amples include the banking industry (with postal banks in UK, Germany, Italy, New Zealand),
as well as TV broadcasting in most of the developed countries. Moreover, health care services
and insurance, transportation, energy, overnight delivery (even in the US) are usually provided
by state-owned enterprises in competition with private ﬁrms. In industrial organization, the
term mixed oligopoly has been used to designate such imperfectly competitive markets.
A strand of theoretical literature began to devote closer attention to mixed oligopolies
in the 1980s, following a privatization wave that started in some of the most industrialized
countries (in particular the U.S. and the U.K.), and soon extended to transition and developing
economies. The aim of this literature has been to characterize mixed oligopoly equilibria and
to study the welfare eﬀects of privatization by adapting the standard oligopoly models to the
presence of welfare-maximizing ﬁrms. Results and policy prescriptions turn out to crucially
depend on the type of competition assumed (in quantity competition, for example, Cournot
or Stackelberg games). In de Fraja and Delbono (1989) it is shown that, if a Stackelberg
game with public leadership is played, privatization cannot improve welfare, absent eﬃciency
gains; while on the contrary, under Cournot competition, this may occur. Beato and Mas-
Colell (1984) show that welfare may be higher when the public ﬁrm is the follower than when
it is the leader in a Stackelberg game.1 During the last decade greater attention has also
been devoted to international mixed oligopolies, in which a domestic public ﬁrm competes
with foreign private ﬁrms.2 Again, results and policy prescriptions over privatization depend
on the type of competition assumed, either simultaneous-move (Cournot) or sequential-move
(Stackelberg) game.
Stemming from the standard analysis of second-best theory (Lipsey and Lancaster, 1956–
1957; Rees, 1984; B¨ os, 1986), the assumption of public leadership has long been considered
rather natural in mixed markets. In fact, claiming the sub-optimality of the marginal-cost
pricing, the public ﬁrm can optimally depart from this rule by taking into account the reaction
of the private ﬁrms when maximizing social welfare. This natural assumption as been criticized
by Cremer et al. (1989) that instead supported the general plausibility of the (Cournot-) Nash
equilibrium in the analysis of oligopolistic markets. Beato and Mas-Colell (1984) shared
the idea of a dominant position of the public ﬁrm, but questioned the optimality of public
leadership. Instead of announcing its output, the public ﬁrm can commit to behaving as
follower by announcing the marginal-cost pricing rule, if private leadership is preferred to the
public leadership equilibrium.
1See de Fraja and Delbono (1990) and Nett (1993) for a survey of these models.
2See for example Fjell and Pal (1996), Pal and White (1998), Fjell and Heywood (2002).
1Importantly, in much of the previous literature on public ﬁrms, it is tacitly assumed
that the public ﬁrm can freely choose the type of the game independently of the behavior
of private ﬁrms. The aim of the present work is to introduce to this literature basic ideas
from endogenous timing theory to identify a suitable timing for a mixed duopoly quantity
game where a private – domestic or foreign – ﬁrm competes with a public, welfare-maximizing
ﬁrm. To this end, we use the model of endogenous timing with observable delay developed by
Hamilton and Slutsky (1990).3 In their model, a preplay stage is added to the duopoly game,
in which players simultaneously decide whether to move early or late in the basic duopoly
game. At the end of this stage, timing decisions are revealed and then the basic game is
played according to the announcements: If both choose the same timing, the game is then
played with simultaneous moves, while if timing decisions are diﬀerent, sequential play under
perfect information – with the order of moves as decided by the players – takes place. As a
consequence, in the subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) of the extended game, the relevant
equilibrium solution for the basic game endogenously emerges. In contrast to the extant
literature, in the present setting, neither ﬁrm can unilaterally choose the timing of the game,
since it is the result of the simultaneous decisions of both ﬁrms.
This feature of the model provides one of the arguments supporting the adoption of the
endogenous timing game to describe market outcomes in mixed oligopolies. On the one hand,
there is no theoretical justiﬁcation for the assumption that the public ﬁrm can choose the
timing of the game independently of the private competitors. Since a dominant position can
only derive from the ability of credible commitment, there is no reason why one should think
that only public ﬁrms has such an ability.4 On the other hand, the timing decisions of the
ﬁrms depend on the payoﬀs in the diﬀerent simultaneous or sequential games that, in turn,
are determined by the primitives of the industry (cost and demand functions). Therefore, the
model presented in this paper can account for the emergence of diﬀerent types of competition
in diﬀerent industries that can be characterized as mixed oligopolies.
This is consistent with some observed facts and empirical ﬁndings in mixed markets. For
example, the state-owned Norwegian supplier of electricity, Statkraft, behaves as if it were the
residual producer in the case of dramatic price change (Magnus and Midttun, 2000). We can
interpret this behavior as the announcement by the state-owned ﬁrm that it is committed to
sustain a certain price level on the market, that is to behave as follower with respect to private
competitors that can choose the optimal level of production knowing the credibly announced
reaction of Statkraft. In industries such as energy markets, capacity investments can easily
work as credible commitments by private ﬁrms to behave as leader in a Stackelberg game. In
3See also Amir (1995) and von Stengel (2010). For a thorough study of Stackelberg leadership when the
leader can commit to mixed strategies, see von Stengel and Zamir (2010).
4Even more stenuous is the claim that the public follower can unilaterally implement the Stackelberg equi-
librium because of its dominant position, as in Beato and Mas-Colell (1984).
2general, whenever public ﬁrms commit to pursuing market goals such as total quantity, price
level or universal service obligations not fulﬁlled by private competitors, one can interpret
such behavior as announcing to “move late”, using the simple endogenous timing terminology.
In health care markets, the public provider in countries such as France and Germany is
usually considered as a leader when competing with private ﬁrms.5 The deﬁnition of the
public ﬁrm’s performance objective can be understood as a credible commitment to “move
early” in order to act as a leader that takes into account what will be produced by the private
competitors.
Over the last decade, several papers have applied this framework to particular instances
of mixed oligopoly quantity games. Pal (1998) analyses a domestic oligopoly with linear cost
and demand functions; Matsumura (2003) focused on international mixed duopoly with con-
vex costs and concave demand; Cornes and Sepahvand (2003) and Sepahvand (2004) consider
international mixed duopolies with strictly log-concave demand and strictly convex cost func-
tions. The aim of the present work is to generalize their analysis for the general case of a mixed
duopoly (both domestic and international) limiting the assumptions to the mildest conditions
needed to ensure existence of equilibria. This approach allows us to identify a general expla-
nation and classiﬁcation of the results that was not fully provided in previous work on the
subject.
We consider all the diﬀerent cases that can arise according to whether the private com-
petitor is domestic or foreign, and to whether the duopoly game is characterized by strategic
complementarity or substitutability. A domestic mixed duopoly diﬀers from an international
one since the private ﬁrm’s proﬁts are not included in the public ﬁrm’s objective function in
the latter case. Our main ﬁnding is that Cournot competition never arises as the equilibrium
of the mixed duopoly game when both ﬁrms are active on the market.
More precisely, we show that when quantities are strategic substitutes for both ﬁrms (i.e.
best-response correspondences are downward sloping), the Stackelberg equilibria with both
private and public leadership arise as the SPE of the endogenous timing game. We then pro-
vide suﬃcient conditions for the emergence of public and/or private leadership Stackelberg
equilibria in a comprehensive characterization of the mixed duopoly quantity game. A suﬃ-
cient condition to have downward sloping best-response correspondence for the private ﬁrm
is the log-concavity of the (inverse) demand function. For the public ﬁrm, the best-response
correspondence is always downward sloping in a domestic duopoly, while this property entails
convexity of the demand function in an international duopoly (in both cases, these conditions
hold true regardless of the cost functions of the two ﬁrms).
Our results have to be contrasted with those obtained in the private duopoly framework.
Amir and Grilo (1999) show that Cournot solution always emerges via the same endogenous
5See for example Barros (1995).
3timing scheme when quantities are strategic substitutes for both ﬁrms, thus giving theoretical
support to the general preference for Cournot over Stackelberg games in a private oligopoly
setting (thus justifying the rejection of Stackelberg’s equilibrium for private duopoly). The
main diﬀerence between the private and mixed duopoly settings lies in the fact that the public
ﬁrm’s objective is generally increasing in private ﬁrm’s output, while the contrary is true for
private ﬁrms.6
As a consequence, under strategic substitutability for both ﬁrms, the public ﬁrm’s output as
Stackelberg leader is smaller than the one in a simultaneous-move game. In order to induce an
increase in the rival’s output, the public leader produces less that in any Cournot equilibrium.
So, the private ﬁrm prefers to be follower than Cournot player and public leadership Pareto
dominates any Cournot equilibrium. The same is true for private leadership: The private ﬁrm
produces more when Stackelberg leader than under Cournot competition and the public ﬁrm
prefers to be follower than simultaneous player.
When the reaction correspondence of the private ﬁrm is increasing while strategic substi-
tutability holds for the public ﬁrm, private leadership is the unique SPE of the endogenous
timing game in both domestic and international duopoly.7 In this case Pareto dominance
of private leadership over Cournot competition again holds, while public leadership domi-
nance is no longer true. In fact, in order to have a larger private production with respect to
simultaneous-move game, the public leader produces more than under Cournot competition
and the private ﬁrm’s proﬁts are reduced. Then, the private ﬁrm always prefers to move early
and the best timing response of the public ﬁrm is to move late.
In an international mixed duopoly a third case may occur. If the demand function is
concave, the best-response correspondence of the public ﬁrm is increasing while the private
ﬁrm’s is decreasing. As a result, the Pareto dominance of the public leadership over Cournot
competition holds, while the private leadership solution does not Pareto dominate the simul-
taneous equilibria. The latter is due to the fact that the private ﬁrm reduces its production as
a Stackelberg leader relative to the Cournot solution. Then, the public ﬁrm always prefers to
move early in order to avoid private leadership, and public leadership emerges as the unique
SPE of the endogenous timing game.
From a methodological point of view, we make extensive use of the basic results of the
theory of supermodular games.8 These are also called games with strategic complementari-
ties and are characterized by the monotonicity of the best responses to rival’s action. The
6As we will see, the public ﬁrm’s objective is always increasing in the rival’s output in an international
mixed duopoly, while in a domestic duopoly this is true when the price is larger than the rival’s marginal cost.
7A suﬃcient condition is log-convexity of demand function and zero production costs for the private ﬁrm.
8This theory was initiated by Topkis (1978, 1979) and further developed by Vives (1990), Milgrom and
Roberts (1990), and Milgrom and Shannon (1994). We base our analysis on the main results of Novshek (1985)
and Amir (1996a) on the private Cournot duopoly.
4advantages of using this approach are that no concavity assumptions are needed and nev-
ertheless existence of pure-strategy Cournot equilibria is guaranteed. Moreover we can deal
with multiplicity of equilibria since they can be preference-ranked for both private and public
ﬁrms.
The present paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3
summarizes the basic mechanism used for endogenous timing and the basic concepts of the
supermodularity approach. Section 4 contains the analysis of an international mixed duopoly,
while Section 5 provides the results for a domestic mixed duopoly. Section 6 brieﬂy concludes.
In the Appendix some intermediate results are provided together with the omitted proofs of
the results of the paper.
2 The model
In this paper we consider a mixed oligopoly market in which one private, proﬁt maximizing
ﬁrm competes with a public ﬁrm whose objective is to maximize domestic social welfare.
The main question under investigation is whether Stackelberg equilibrium might constitute a
more natural solution concept than standard (simultaneous-move) Cournot-Nash equilibrium
for such markets. We elaborate on this central issue in full generality, allowing for separate
analysis of two possible scenarios depending on whether the private ﬁrm is foreign or domestic,
and for diﬀerent assumptions on market demand and ﬁrms’ cost functions.
The two ﬁrms, labeled 1 (private ﬁrm) and 0 (public ﬁrm), compete in quantities and their
products are homogeneous (or perfect substitutes). The market inverse demand function is
P( ), and the two cost functions are C1 (q1) and C0 (q0). The two ﬁrms’ proﬁt functions are
then
Π1 (q0,q1) = q1P (q0 + q1) − C1 (q1)
and





P (z)dz − (q0 + q1)P (q0 + q1).
Since the public ﬁrm’s objective function is social welfare, it depends on whether the private
ﬁrm is domestic or foreign. We shall analyze the two cases separately. If the private ﬁrm is
domestic, then the public ﬁrm maximizes




P (z)dz − C0 (q0) − C1 (q1). (1)
5If the private ﬁrm is foreign, the public ﬁrm’s objective is




P (z)dz − q1P (q0 + q1) − C0 (q0). (2)
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Thus, in any mixed-duopoly Cournot equilibrium, each ﬁrm optimally replies to the action
of the rival and so (qc
0,qc
1) must lie on the best-response correspondences of both ﬁrms. The
latter are deﬁned in the standard way:
r0 (q1) , argmax
q0≥0
Wi(q0,q1) i = d,f (3)
r1 (q0) , argmax
q1≥0
Π1 (q0,q1). (4)
We denote the set of (mixed-duopoly) Nash-Cournot equilibria by N.
A Stackelberg equilibrium of this game corresponds to the subgame perfect equilibrium
(SPE) of a two stage game of perfect information in which the second mover (follower) chooses
an action after having observed the action of the ﬁrst mover (leader). A strategy for the leader
is to pick a quantity qi ≥ 0 and a strategy for the follower is ρj (qi), where ρj ( ) is a mapping
from the domain of qi to the domain of qj. Assuming that ﬁrm 0 is the leader, a Stackelberg
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In other words, a Stackelberg equilibrium imposes that: (i) the strategy of the second
mover be a single-valued selection from its best-response correspondence; and (ii) the ﬁrst
6mover choose an action that maximizes its objective function given the anticipation of the
rival’s reaction.




































We denote the set of Stackelberg equilibria with public and private leadership by S0 and
S1 respectively.
Since the leader’s optimal choice results from a pure optimization problem, all the points
in Si must yield the same payoﬀ to the leader (ﬁrm i). It follows that the Stackelberg solution
is generically unique (i.e., multiple solutions would turn into a unique outcome upon a slight
perturbation of the primitives of the duopoly).
Throughout the paper we assume the following very general conditions.
Assumption 1 The inverse demand function P ( ) is twice continuously diﬀerentiable and
positive (in the relevant range) with P′ ( ) < 0 and limx→∞P (x) = 0.
Assumption 2 The cost functions C0 ( ) and C1 ( ) are strictly increasing and twice contin-
uously diﬀerentiable with Ci (0) = 0 ∀i = 0,1.
Under these assumptions both ﬁrms’ action sets are compact since the ﬁrms never pro-
duce quantities larger than some upper-bound. This is due to the fact that price is strictly
decreasing to 0 and marginal costs are strictly positive. As a consequence, there exists a ki
such that the outputs (ki,∞) are strictly dominated strategies for ﬁrm i = 0,1.
3 Endogenous timing: Some basics
As this paper brings together two diﬀerent methodologies, this section provides a self-contained
but simple summary of the notions and results from endogenous timing theory, and from
supermodular optimization and games, that are needed in this paper.
3.1 Endogenous timing
The aim of this paper is to identify the appropriate sequencing of moves in a mixed duopoly
game. We investigate how the choice between simultaneous (Cournot) and sequential (Stack-
elberg) games and the assignment of leader and follower roles in the latter case arise endoge-
nously. To this end, we adopt the simple model of extended game with observable delay due
to Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) (also see Amir, 1995).
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Figure 1: The extensive form of the Hamilton and Slutsky (1990)’s model extended game with
observable delay.
In this model, a preplay stage is added to the duopoly game. At this stage players simul-
taneously decide whether to move early or late in the ”basic duopoly game”.9 At the end
of this stage, timing decisions are revealed and the basic game is then played according to
these announcements: if both players choose the same timing, simultaneous (Cournot) game
is played; while, if timing decisions are diﬀerent, sequential play under perfect information –
with the order of moves as decided by the players – occurs. As a consequence, the subgame
perfect equilibrium of the extended game endogenously determines the relevant equilibrium
concept for the basic game. It should be emphasized that a player cannot unilaterally choose
to be a leader or a follower. However, he may elect not to be a follower simply by deciding to
move early in the preplay stage, or not to be a leader by deciding to move late.
In Figure 3.1 the game tree of the extended game with observable delay of Hamilton and
Slutsky (1990) is depicted.
The following Proposition summarizes the results of the Hamilton and Slutsky (1990)
9What the literature on endogenous timing refers to as “basic game” actually consists of three distinct
games, depending on whether play is simultaneous or sequential, and in the latter case on whether player 0
or 1 is the ﬁrst-mover. With this point clariﬁed, we continue to abuse terminology by referring to these three
games collectively as the ”basic game”.
8model. It characterizes the pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibria (henceforth, SPE) of the
extended game, that is a pair of timing announcements and the equilibrium quantities in the
basic game. For the time being, we have to assume that leadership payoﬀs are strictly larger
than any mixed-duopoly Cournot payoﬀ and that all equilibria exist. In the next sections we
deﬁne conditions for existence of equilibria in the two cases of domestic and foreign private
ﬁrm, and show that the leader’s payoﬀs are indeed always larger than the corresponding Nash
payoﬀs under our assumptions.10
A central result for the outcome of this endogenous timing scheme, which is repeatedly
invoked in the upcoming analysis is as follows (for a proof, see Hamilton and Slutsky, 1990).
For the basic game, let N denote respectively the set of (simultaneous-move) pure-strategy
Nash equilibria, Si the set of Stackelberg equilibria with ﬁrm i as leader, i = 0,1, respectively.
Let E denote the set of subgame-perfect equilibria of the (endogenous-timing) extended game.
Proposition 3 Consider a two-player game in which Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg equilibria
with both order of moves exist. Assume that both ﬁrms strictly prefers the leader payoﬀ to any
simultaneous play playoﬀ. Then:
(i) if each ﬁrm’s Stackelberg follower payoﬀ is smaller than its least preferred simultaneous
play payoﬀ, then both ﬁrms decide to move early and Cournot equilibrium is the unique
SPE of the extended game, i.e. E = N.
(ii) if each ﬁrm’s Stackelberg follower payoﬀ is strictly larger than its most preferred simul-
taneous play payoﬀ, then sequential play with either order of move are the only (pure-
strategy) SPEs of the extended game, i.e., E = S0 ∪ S1.
(iii) if ﬁrm i’s Stackelberg follower payoﬀ is strictly larger than its most preferred simultaneous
play payoﬀ and if ﬁrm j’s Stackelberg follower payoﬀ is strictly smaller than its least
preferred Cournot payoﬀ, then ﬁrm j moves early, ﬁrm i moves late and j-leadership is
the unique SPE of the extended game, i.e. i.e., E = Sj.
In a nutshell, this result says that a particular Stackelberg equilibrium will prevail if the
corresponding follower prefers his payoﬀ then to what he would get at the Cournot-Nash
equilibrium. Since the leader always has such a preference, a Stackelberg outcome will prevail
if and only if it Pareto dominates a Nash outcome. If the same preference does not hold for
either player, then the outcome will be Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
10This fact is always true when the reaction correspondences are continuous functions, but as the present
setting allows for discontinuities, the same result requires proof.
93.2 Supermodular optimization and games
As much of the analysis of the present paper rests crucially on some basic results from the
theory of supermodular games, we now provide a brief overview of the needed notions (see
Topkis, 1978, 1998, for more details).
A function F : R2
























− F (x,y) > (<)0
Topkis’s Theorem (1978) states that if F (x,y) satisﬁes increasing diﬀerences (decreasing dif-
ferences), then the correspondence x∗(y) , argmax
x≥0
F (x,y) has the property that all its
selections are increasing (decreasing) in y. Milgrom and Shannon (1994) showed that the
same conclusion holds when F (x,y) satisﬁes only the SCP in (x,y)11
In the present paper, we make use of a stronger version of these results: If
∂F(x,y)
∂x is
strictly increasing (decreasing) in y, then every selection of x∗ is strictly increasing (strictly
decreasing) in y (Amir (1996b, Theorem 3) and Topkis (1998, p. 79)).
It is well-known that unambiguous endogenous timing outcomes for a two-player game are
predicated on each of the best responses being monotonic (increasing or decreasing) and on
each payoﬀ function satisfying the uni-signed externality property (positive or negative): See
Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) and Amir (1995). To deal with these properties, we need to
deﬁne the corresponding classes of games.
A game is supermodular (submodular), or equivalently has strategic complementarities
(substitutabilities), if each payoﬀ function has the SCP (dual SCP). The key property of
such games is that the associated best response mapping has maximal and minimal selections
that are increasing (decreasing) functions, a direct consequence of Topkis’s Theorem. We will
also consider some hybrid-complementarity games, characterized by the SCP for one payoﬀ
function and the dual SCP for the other.
A game has positive (negative) externalities if each payoﬀ function is increasing (decreas-
ing) in rival’s action. We will also consider some hybrid-externality games, characterized by
uni-signed externalities, positive for one payoﬀ function and negative for the other.
11Note that IDP is a cardinal property of the function F, while SCP is an ordinal property.
104 Endogenous timing in mixed duopoly with a foreign private
ﬁrm
In this section we consider the case in which the private ﬁrm is foreign, so that its proﬁts are
not included in the objective function of the public ﬁrm, as deﬁned in equation (2). As noted
earlier, endogenous timing outcomes depend crucially on the signs of the payoﬀ externalities
and the slopes of the reaction curves of the basic game. When the private ﬁrm is foreign, there
are three separate sign conﬁgurations that lead to diﬀerent endogenous timing outcomes. All
three conﬁgurations share the central result that Cournot equilibrium (i.e, simultaneous play
in the mixed duopoly) never arises in any SPE of the endogenous timing game. In other words,
the outcome is always Stackelberg leadership but the identity of the leader varies across the
three cases.
We begin by observing that the payoﬀ externalities are always unambiguously pinned down
by the fact that demand is strictly decreasing: Indeed, the private ﬁrm’s proﬁt is strictly




= P′ (q0 + q1)q1 < 0 ∀q0,q1 ≥ 0 (5)
∂Wf (q0,q1)
∂q1
= −q1P′ (q0 + q1) > 0 ∀q0,q1 ≥ 0. (6)
As to the sign of the slopes of the reaction curves of the basic game, we now provide suﬃcient
conditions for each of them to increase or decrease in the next two intermediate results.
Lemma 4 In addition to Assumptions 1 and 2,
(a) Assume that P′′ ( ) > 0. Then any selection of the public ﬁrm’s best-response correspon-
dence r0 (q1) is strictly decreasing whenever interior.
(b) Assume that P′′ ( ) < 0. Then any selection of r0 (q1) is strictly increasing whenever
interior.
Lemma 5 In addition to Assumptions 1 and 2:
(a) Assume that P ( ) is strongly log-concave. i.e. that12
P (x)P′′ (x) − P′2 (x) < 0, ∀x > 0.
Then, every selection of the private ﬁrm’s best-response correspondence r1 (q0) is strictly
decreasing whenever interior.
12An alternative assumption that yields decreasing reaction curves is P
′ (x) + xP
′′ (x) < 0 (Novshek, 1985).
11(b) Assume that C1 ( ) ≡ 0 and P( ) is strongly log-convex everywhere, i.e.
P (x)P′′ (x) − P′2 (x) > 0, ∀x > 0.
Then, every selection of the best-response correspondence r1 (q0) is strictly increasing
whenever interior.
As discussed in detail in Amir (1996), the presence of signiﬁcant variable or ﬁxed costs is
not compatible with globally increasing reaction curves for private ﬁrms in a Cournot setting
(unless the inverse demand curve remains above the average cost curve even for arbitrarily
large outputs, an unrealistic case).13
Of the four possible cases where the two reactions curces are monotonic (upward or down-
ward), the case in which both are increasing is ruled out by the above lemmas. Indeed, by
Lemma 5(b), P′′ ( ) > 0 is a necessary condition to have a strictly increasing private ﬁrm’s
best response, but P′′ ( ) > 0 implies that the public ﬁrm’s best response is downward sloping.
Throughout the paper, we allow the basic game to have multiple pure-strategy Nash equi-
libria, i.e. N need not be a singleton. However, we treat S0 and S1 as singletons, since it can
be shown that this is generically the case.14
The following Theorem characterizes the SPE of the extended game, thus determining
clear-cut endogenous timing, for the case where the mixed duopoly is a game of strict strategic
substitutes (for both ﬁrms), positive externality for the public ﬁrm and negative externality
for the private ﬁrm. Under the assumptions of this Theorem, the mixed-duopoly quantity
game is a supermodular game, which implies that the set N of pure strategy mixed-duopoly
Cournot equilibria is nonempty.15 Under the same assumptions, Stackelberg equilibria with
either public or private leadership exist and the set S0 and S1 are nonempty.16
Theorem 6 Assume that P ( )P′′ ( )−P′2 ( ) < 0 but P′′ ( ) > 0. Then Stackelberg equilibria
with either order of moves are the only SPE of the endogenous timing game. In other words,
E = S1 × S2.
13On the other hand, the presence of relatively small variable or ﬁxed costs is consistent with an increasing
reaction curve over a range of rival’s outputs that may be large enough to constitute the relevant range for the
analysis at hand. For simplicity, we simply assume zero costs, so that the upward monotonicity of the reaction
curve is global.
14In other words, the case in which the leader’s optimization problem has two or more global optima is
non-generic.
15Following Vives (1990), reversing the natural order of the public ﬁrm’s action set, the game becomes
supermodular with eﬀective strategy set [0,k0] × [0,k1]. By Tarski’s ﬁxed point theorem the set N is not
empty.
16Note that the eﬀective action spaces are compact and the payoﬀ functions are jointly continuous, so that
the follower’s best response correspondence has a closed graph. Then, as proved by Hellwig and Leininger
(1987), Stackelberg equilibria exist.
12This result requires P ( ) to be both strongly convex and strongly log-concave, which are
clearly mutually compatible conditions. A class of examples is P (x) = e−xα
, with α > 1.
The following direct consequence is worth noting, even though it follows at once from the
mechanism invoked here for endogenous timing (in other words, its proof indeed forms part
of the proof of the previous Theorem).
Corollary 7 At either of the two Stackelberg equilibria, social welfare and private proﬁt are
higher than at the corresponding (simultaneous-move) Nash equilibrium, i.e. welfare is higher
at S0 or S1 than at N.
This result is depicted in Figure 2. From Proposition 3 is clear that Stackelberg play arises
in the equilibrium of the endogenous timing game only if it Pareto dominates the Cournot
equilibrium. In the case discussed in Theorem 6 both private and public leadership equilibria














Figure 2: Both Stackelberg equilibria Pareto dominates the Cournot equilibria
The following Remark discusses the only possible boundary solution, which we rule out
only for the sake of avoiding making uninteresting statements about the set E of endogenous
timings.






is not on the boundary, i.e., such that q
0 = 0. If q
0 were ever equal to 0, it would mean that
13a monopolist solution prevails as a Cournot equilibrium of the basic game, in which case the
Cournot equilibrium would also coincide with both Stackelberg equilibria, and would thus also
be an SPE of the endogenous timing game. We rule out this uninteresting case with a tacit





. Similar tacit interiority assumptions are maintained in
what follows.
The next Theorem analyzes the case in which the private ﬁrm’s reaction correspondence
is increasing in the rival’s output, while the public ﬁrm’s is still downward-sloping. Here
we cannot invoke the results of the theory of supermodular games, since the two reaction
correspondences slope in opposite directions, implying that it is not possible to re-order action
sets in such a way that both reaction correspondences slope upward. As a consequence,
to guarantee existence of Cournot equilibria, we need to revert to the standard approach
for establishing existence of pure-strategy Cournot equilibrium, which requires strict quasi-
concavity of each ﬁrm’s objective function in own output to ensure single-valuedness and
continuity of the ﬁrms’ reaction functions. This is done via the suﬃcient conditions stated in
the following result.
Lemma 9 Under the assumptions of point (b) in Lemma 5, the following hold:
(a) The private ﬁrm’s proﬁt function is strictly quasi-concave in own output if 1/P( ) is a
strictly convex function, i.e. if
P( )P′′( ) − 2(P′)2( ) < 0 (7)
(b) The public ﬁrm’s objective function is strictly concave in own output if
P′ (q0 + q1) − C′′
0 (q0) < 0, ∀q0,q1 ≥ 0. (8)





= (P′ − C′′
0) − q1P′′ < 0,
since P′′ > 0 by log-convexity.
The following Theorem characterizes the SPE of the extended game, thus determining
clear-cut endogenous timing, for the case where the mixed duopoly is a game of strategic com-
plements for the private ﬁrm and strategic substitutes for the public ﬁrm, positive externality
for the public ﬁrm and negative externality for the private ﬁrm. Since the monotonicity struc-
ture of hybrid-complementarity games does not guarantee existence of pure-strategy Nash
equilibria, again concavity-type assumptions are needed to ensure existence via the continuity
of the best response functions.
14Theorem 10 Assume that C1 ( ) ≡ 0, P ( )P′′ ( ) − P′2 ( ) > 0, and conditions (7)-(8) hold.
Then, private leadership emerges as the unique SPE of the extended game.
In this case again, it is worth observing a direct consequence of this result is that equilib-
rium social welfare and private proﬁt are higher under private leadership than under simulta-













Figure 3: Private Leadership equilibrium Pareto dominates the Cournot equilibria, while
public leadership does not and therefore only the ﬁrst arises in the SPE of the endogenous
timing game.
The following Theorem characterizes the SPE of the extended game in the third possible
conﬁguration, the case where the mixed duopoly is a game of strategic substitutes for the
private ﬁrm and strategic complements for the public ﬁrm, along with positive externality
for the public ﬁrm and negative externality for the private ﬁrm. Since the monotonicity
structure of hybrid-complementarity games does not guarantee existence of pure-strategy Nash
equilibria, some concavity-type assumptions are needed to ensure continuous best response
functions.
Theorem 11 Assume that P′′( ) < 0, and conditions (7)-(8) hold. Then public leadership
always emerges as the unique SPE of the endogenous timing game.
Once more, it follows that equilibrium social welfare and private proﬁt are higher under












Figure 4: Public leadership equilibrium Pareto dominates the Cournot equilibria, while private
leadership does not. Only the former arises in the endogenous timing equilibrium.
5 Endogenous timing in mixed duopoly with a domestic pri-
vate ﬁrm
In this section we consider the case in which the private ﬁrm is domestic, so that a public
ﬁrm maximizing social welfare includes private proﬁts in its objective function, as deﬁned in
equation (1). As in the previous setting, we prove that Cournot equilibrium never arises in any
SPE of the endogenous timing game17. However, in contrast to the case of a foreign private
ﬁrm, public leadership cannot arise as a SPE of the endogenous timing scheme at hand.
As before, we begin with the signs of the payoﬀ externalities. While the private ﬁrm’s
proﬁts are strictly decreasing in the public ﬁrm’s quantity (see (5)), welfare is a priori non-
monotonic in the output of the private ﬁrm. Nonetheless, as long as price is above the private
ﬁrm’s marginal cost, welfare is increasing in the private ﬁrm’s output, since
∂Wd (q0,q1)
∂q1
= P (q0 + q1) − C′
1 (q1).
In the following Lemmas we state suﬃcient conditions for monotonicity of best responses when
the private ﬁrm is domestic.
17As before, this conclusion assumes that Cournot equilibrium does not coincide with both Stackelberg
equilibria. The latter possibility may occur only on the boundary, when a monopoly solution arises.
16Lemma 12 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, any selection of the public ﬁrm’s best-response cor-
respondence r0(q1) is strictly decreasing for every q1 ≥ 0 such that r0 (q1) > 0.
Thus, in contrast to the case of an international mixed duopoly, the public ﬁrm’s objective
function is always submodular here. In what follows we ﬁrst characterize the case in which
the best-response correspondences are decreasing for both ﬁrms. As in the previous Section 4,
this is a suﬃcient condition for the game to be supermodular (via the reversal of the order on
one of the players’ action set), so that existence of mixed-duopoly Cournot and Stackelberg
equilibria is guaranteed. The following Theorem characterizes the SPE of the extended game
when public and private quantities are strategic substitutes for both ﬁrms.
Theorem 13 Assume that P ( )P′′ ( ) − P′2 ( ) < 0, and that the public ﬁrm’s cost function
C0 ( ) is convex. Then, Stackelberg equilibria with either order of moves are the only SPEs of
the endogenous timing game.
The intuition for this result is as follows. If the public ﬁrm is the leader, it produces
a lower quantity than in any mixed-duopoly Cournot equilibrium (point (ii) in Lemma 19).
The reason is that in any Cournot equilibrium the public ﬁrm does not take into account the
strategic (negative) eﬀects of its action on the private ﬁrm’s production. So, when this eﬀect
is taken into account, the public leader reduces its quantity, and the private ﬁrm produces
more than in any Cournot equilibrium. As a result, private proﬁts are larger under public
leadership than under simultaneous-move competition.
When the private ﬁrm acts as leader, it increases its quantity with respect to any mixed-
duopoly Cournot equilibrium (point (i) in Lemma 19). In fact, it internalizes the strategic
(negative) eﬀects of its action on the rival’s production and can increase proﬁts by increasing
its own output. The public ﬁrm prefers to be the follower than to play simultaneously because
the variation in welfare has the same sign and larger magnitude than the variation in private
ﬁrm’s proﬁts, as long as we compare two points on the public ﬁrm’s reaction correspondence.
As was the case with a foreign ﬁrm, a direct corollary of this Theorem is that, at either
of the two Stackelberg equilibria, social welfare and private proﬁt are higher than at the
corresponding (simultaneous-move) Nash equilibrium, i.e. welfare is higher at S0 or S1 than
at N.
The next Theorem analyzes the case in which the private ﬁrm’s best-response correspon-
dence is increasing in the rival’s output. As in the previous Section, the game is not super-
modular. We need again to assume quasi-concavity of welfare in public ﬁrm’s quantity.
Theorem 14 Assume that C1 ( ) ≡ 0, P ( )P′′ ( )−P′2 ( ) > 0, but that P( )P′′( )−2(P′)2( ) <
0. Assume also that the public ﬁrm’s cost function C0 ( ) is convex. Then r0 (.) and r1 (.) are
17single-valued continuous functions that are strictly decreasing and strictly increasing, respec-
tively. Then, private leadership always emerges as the unique SPE of the extended game.
In this case, diﬀerently from the one analyzed in Theorem 13, the strategic eﬀect of public
ﬁrm’s action on private ﬁrm’s production is positive. So, taking into account this eﬀect, the
public leader produces more than at the Cournot equilibrium. As a consequence, the private
ﬁrm’s proﬁts are smaller under public leadership than at the Cournot equilibrium, and playing
as follower is not an equilibrium for the private ﬁrm. The private leadership equilibrium always
arises in the SPE given that the public ﬁrm prefers to be a follower for the very same reason
as in Theorem 13.
6 Conclusion
This paper has provided a thorough investigation of the possible endogenous timing outcomes
for a mixed duopoly with a foreign or a domestic private ﬁrm, under very general speciﬁcations
of the inverse demand and cost structures. Our main result is that (simultaneous-move)
Cournot equilibrium never arises in the endogenous timing equilibrium of the mixed duopoly
game (as long as both ﬁrms produce positive quantities at equilibrium). When quantities are
strategic substitutes for both ﬁrms, the two Stackelberg equilibria arise as the only SPEs of
the endogenous timing game, irrespective of whether the private ﬁrm is foreign or domestic.
In this case, the timing scheme invoked here does not allow one to unambiguously assign
leader and follower roles to the two ﬁrms. When either the public or the private ﬁrm has
upward sloping best responses, then the endogenous timing scheme yields sequential play as
the unique equilibrium with that ﬁrm as the leader.
Using the natural and simple endogenous time scheme of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990),
our results provide a justiﬁcation to the use of the Stackelberg concept of equilibrium in mixed
duopolies. The striking diﬀerence between the result obtained in a mixed duopoly and in a
standard private duopoly is primarily explained by the fact that the objective function of a
public ﬁrm is generally increasing in the rival’s output, while the opposite is true for a private
ﬁrm. In contrast to the concensus that has crystallized around the lack of economic justiﬁ-
cation for sequential moves in classical quantity oligopoly, the emergence of sequential play
as the natural timing for a mixed duopoly suggests a new opportunity to view Stackelberg’s
classical proposal as being appropriate in some oligopoly settings including a public ﬁrm.
If we couple this claim with the results in the private duopoly framework provided by
Amir and Grilo (1999), where the Cournot solution is the general outcome, we gain new
insights on the eﬀect of privatization (here viewed simply as a change of status of a ﬁrm,
from public to private). The change in the objective of the former public ﬁrm is not the sole
eﬀect of privatization. In fact, when it is more reasonable to assume that ﬁrms choose not
18only what action to take, but also when to take them, also the timing of the game changes.
Since the Stackelberg equilibria dominates Cournot solutions in terms of social welfare, any
positive eﬀects of privatization that might be derived under the assumption of Cournot-Nash
equilibrium of the game would be overstated and might require revisiting if sequential play is
a realistic alternative.
7 Appendix
The Appendix includes most of the proofs of the paper but also some intermediate results
that are needed for the proof of the main theorems of the paper.
Proof of Lemma 4. A suﬃcient condition to have Wf (q0,q1) strictly supermodular
(strict submodular) is
∂2W f(q0,q1)
∂q0∂q1 > (<)0. By the strengthening of Topkis’s Theorem given in
Amir (1996b) or Edlin and Shannon (1998), a suﬃcient condition for every selection of r0 (.) to
be strictly increasing (strictly decreasing) whenever it is interior is for
∂W f(q0,q1)
∂q0 to be strictly




= −q1P′′ (q0 + q1).
Proof of Lemma 5.




= P′ (q0 + q1) + q1P′′ (q0 + q1) < 0, ∀q0,q1 ≥ 0
which is equivalent to
P′ (x) + xP′′ (x) < 0, ∀x ≥ 0
A suﬃcient condition for the strict dual SSCP is
P (x)P′′ (x) − P′2 (x) < 0, ∀x ≥ 0
as deﬁned in Amir (1996a). If one of these conditions holds, then any selection of the
private ﬁrm’s best-response correspondence is strictly decreasing (Amir, 1996b).
b) Since the production costs of the private ﬁrm are zero, its objective is q1P (q0 + q1).
Given that logP ( ) is convex by assumption, it follows that the objective is strictly
log-supermodular, i.e.
∂2 logq1P (q0 + q1)
∂q0∂q1
=
P (q0 + q1)P′′ (q0 + q1) − P′2 (q0 + q1)
P2 (q0 + q1)
> 0.
19So, every selection of the private ﬁrm best-response correspondence is strictly increasing
(Amir, 1996b).
Before starting the proof of Theorem 6 we need to establish some intermediate results in
the following Lemmas 15, 16, and 17.
Lemma 15 Consider the case of a foreign private ﬁrm. Under the assumptions of point (a) in





where the private ﬁrm produces






is the Pareto dominant mixed-duopoly Cournot equilibrium.
Proof. Reversing the natural order of the public ﬁrm’s action set, the set N has a largest





.18 We show that this is the
most preferred Cournot equilibrium by both private and public ﬁrms. Consider any other










it follows that b q1 < q1
and b q0 > q
0.











> Π1 (b q0, b q1) (9)
where the ﬁrst inequality derives from q1 being best response to q
0, and the second
inequality is due to private ﬁrm’s objective being strictly decreasing in q0.






≥ Wf (b q0,q1) > Wf (b q0, b q1) (10)
where the ﬁrst inequality is due to the fact that q
0 is a best response to q1 and the
second derives from Wf being strictly increasing in q1.
This completes the proof.
Lemma 16 Consider the case of a foreign private ﬁrm. Under the assumptions of point (a)
in Lemma 5 and P′′ ( ) > 0, the output of the private ﬁrm (public ﬁrm) in a Stackelberg game
under either order of moves is larger (smaller) than in the Pareto-dominant mixed-duopoly
Cournot equilibrium.
Proof. We have to distinguish the two cases of (i) private leadership, and (ii) public
leadership.
18See Milgrom and Roberts (1990, Theorem 5).





















lay on GR r0(.), which has only decreasing selections,























where the ﬁrst inequality is due to q1 being a best response to q
0 and the second by
the fact that Π1 is strictly decreasing in q0. Inequality (11) contradicts the nature of
Stackelberg equilibrium and so it is always the case that ql



































where the ﬁrst inequality is due to q
0 being best response to q1 and the second to the
fact that Wf (.) is strictly increasing in q1. Inequality (12) contradicts the nature of





This completes the proof.
Lemma 17 Under the assumptions of point (a) in Lemma 5 and P′′ ( ) > 0, the payoﬀ of the
leader in any Stackelberg equilibrium is strictly larger than in any Cournot equilibrium as long





















= 0 i = d,f
We analyze the two possible Stackelberg games separately again.
(i) With private leadership, the private ﬁrm’s objective can be shown to be Π1 (r0(q1),q1)
where r0( ) is the minimal selection from the public ﬁrm’s optimal reaction correspon-
dence (see Amir and Grilo, 1999, for a proof). By the Maximum Theorem, the corre-
spondence r0 has a closed graph. Hence, r0 is lower semi-continous and right-continuous
(for a proof, see Amir, 1996b). Since Π1 is decreasing in its ﬁrst argument and r0 is de-






can have only upward jumps in q1 (and no







∈ S1 is also interior,































is a right Dini derivate.19 Since
∂Π1(q
0q1)



























 ∈ S1, and ql


















(ii) With public leadership, the public ﬁrm’s objective can be shown to be Wi (q0,r1(q0))
where r1( ) is the maximal selection from the public ﬁrm’s optimal reaction correspon-







lies on r1 ( ), the
following ﬁrst-order condition of the private ﬁrm holds:
P (q0 + r1 (q0)) + r1 (q0)P′ (q0 + r1 (q0)) − C′

















∂q1 > 0. Using also the fact that r1 is decreasing and left-continuous (as
in Part (i)), we know that Wi (q0,r1(q0)) can have only downward jumps in q0 (and







∈ S0 is interior, the







































is interior, we have r′
1(ql
0) < 0 via an argument similar to the analogous
































19The four Dini derivates are the limsup and liminf of the one-sided (left and right) directional slopes starting
at any point and always exist in the extended reals.
22This completes the proof.












∈ S1 is such that ql















0. Now we show that each ﬁrm strictly prefers being a follower in a sequential-move
game to the Pareto dominant Cournot equilibrium.


















where the ﬁrst inequality comes from the fact that q
f
1 is a best response to ql
0 and the second
is due to the private ﬁrm’s objective being strictly decreasing in q0.



















where the ﬁrst inequality is due to q
f
0 being a best response to ql
1, and the second derives from
the fact that W is strictly increasing in q1.
Then, the conditions of point (ii) of Proposition 3 hold and both Stackelberg equilibria are
SPEs of the endogenous timing game.
Proof of Theorem 10. By strict quasi-concavity of both objectives, the reaction
correspondences of both ﬁrms are (single-valued) continuous functions. Moreover the reaction






is unique. We now prove that: (i) the public ﬁrm is
better oﬀ in the private leadership than in the mixed-duopoly Cournot equilibrium; while
(ii) the private ﬁrm’s payoﬀ is strictly larger in the Cournot than in the public leadership
equilibrium.
(i) For the private leadership equilibrium, since r0 is strictly decreasing in the interior, we
can apply the same analysis as in point (i) in Lemmas 16-17 to show that ql

















> Wf  
q0,q1
￿
where the ﬁrst inequality is due to q
f
0 being best response to ql
1, and the second derives
from the fact that Wf is strictly increasing in q1.








∈ S0 is such that ql
0 > q0 and q
f
1 > q1. Suppose by contradic-
tion that ql



















where the ﬁrst inequality comes from q0 being a best response to q1 and the second is
due to Wf (q0,q1) being strictly increasing in q1. Therefore ql
0 ≥ q0. Moreover, by an








0. Since r1 is strictly increasing in the interior it follows that q
f
1 > q1.




















where the ﬁrst inequality follows from the property of Cournot equilibria and the second
from the fact that Π1 is strictly decreasing in q0. Then, the private ﬁrm strictly prefers
Cournot to public leadership equilibria.
The conditions of point iii) of Proposition 3 hold and the private leadership equilibrium is
the unique SPE of the endogenous timing game.
Proof of Theorem 11. By the strict quasi-concavity of both Wf (.) and Π1 (.), r0 (q1)
and r1 (q0) are single-valued continuous functions. Moreover, r0 (q1) is strictly increasing and
r1 (q0) is strictly decreasing in the interior. Hence, there exists a unique Cournot equilibrium,





. We now prove that: (i) the public ﬁrm’s payoﬀ is strictly
larger in the Cournot equilibrium that in the private leadership equilibrium; while (ii) the
private ﬁrm is better oﬀ in the public leadership equilibrium than in the Cournot equilibrium.
(i) First we show that the private leadership equilibrium is such that ql




Suppose by contradiction that ql





















where the ﬁrst inequality is due to q1 being a best response to q0, and the second derives
from the fact that Π1 (q0,q1) is strictly decreasing in q0. Therefore ql































24where the ﬁrst inequality is due to q0 being best response to q1 and the second to
Wf (q0,q1) being strictly increasing in q1.





and since r1 is strictly decreasing in the interior we can
apply the same analysis as point (ii) in the proof of Lemma 16 to show that ql
0 ≤ q0 and
q
f




 ∈ S0 and therefore
ql




















where the ﬁrst inequality follows from the fact that q
f
1 is a best response to ql
0 and the
second from the fact that Π1 (q0,q1) is strictly decreasing in q0. Then, the private ﬁrm
strictly prefers public leadership to the best Cournot equilibrium.
The conditions of point iii) of Proposition 3 hold and public leadership is the unique SPE
of the endogenous timing game.
Proof of Lemma 12. Since the public ﬁrm maximizes total welfare as deﬁned in
equation (1), its objective has DDP since
∂2Wd (q0,q1)
∂q0∂q1
= P′ (q0 + q1) < 0 ∀q0,q1 ≥ 0.
So, under the standard assumptions, any selection of the best-response correspondence of the
public ﬁrm is strictly decreasing.
In order to prove Theorem 13, we need to establish some intermediate results in the
following Lemmas 18 and 19.






to be the Pareto dominant mixed-duopoly Cournot equilibrium
is that the public ﬁrm’s cost function is convex in the relevant range.











is such that b q1 < q1 and b q0 > q
0.





> Π1 (b q0, b q1), as shown in Lemma 15 by the
inequality chain (9);
25(ii) For the public ﬁrm, we ﬁrst show that the slopes of r0 (q1) are all in [−1,0). To this end,
consider the change of variable x = q0 + q1 and view x as the new decision variable for





P (t)dt − C0 (x − q1) − C1 (q1)
Since the cross-partial of this objective w.r.t. x and q1 is equal to C′′
0 (x − q1) ≥ 0 by the
convexity assumption, we conclude that the argmax x∗(q1) is increasing in q1 (note here
that x∗(q1) is single-valued since Wd is strictly concave in q0). Since x∗(q1) = r0(q1)+q1,
we conclude that the slopes of r0(q1) are all ≥ −1. A standard application of the smooth
Implicit Function Theorem shows that r′
0(q1) ≥ −1.























where the latter equality derives from the application of the Envelope Theorem. Hence,
∂Wd (r0 (q1),q1)
∂q1
= P (r0 (q1) + q1) − C′
1 (q1)
≥ P (r0 (q1) + q1) − C′
1 (q1) + [1 + r′




where the inequality follows from the fact that −1 ≤ r′
















− Π1 (b q0, b q1) > 0
where the latter inequality comes from the result in point (i).
This completes the proof.21
20GR stays for the graph of the best-reply function ri (·).
21Note that this result has the obvious extension that all the mixed duopoly Cournot equilibria can be Pareto
ranked from the smallest to the largest in the reversed order. A similar result is obtained by Milgrom and
Roberts (1990, Theorem 7) for 2-player supermodular games when both objectives are monotonic in the rival’s
action. Since the public ﬁrm’s objective has not this property, we have developed a novel methodology to make
comparative statics in the framework of a (domestic) mixed duopoly.
26Lemma 19 Consider the case of a domestic private ﬁrm. In addition to the assumptions in
Lemma 5(a), assume that the public ﬁrm’s cost function is convex. Then, the output of the
private ﬁrm (public ﬁrm) in any Stackelberg game with both orders of moves is strictly larger
(strictly smaller) than in the Pareto-dominant mixed duopoly Cournot equilibrium.
Proof. We distinguish the two cases of (i) private leadership, and (ii) public leadership.
(i) The case of private leadership has been already discussed in Lemmas 16-17 where it is
shown that ql









(ii) The case of public leadership is instead diﬀerent since Wd is not always increasing in q1.
We need therefore a diﬀerent proof. Suppose by contradiction that ql
1 < q1.












































lay on GR r0 (.), we can apply the






























































where the ﬁrst inequality comes from q1 being a best response to q
0, and the second is








inequalities (16) and (17), whenever q
f


























which contradicts the nature of Stackelberg equilibrium. Therefore, it must be that
q
f
1 ≥ q1and ql
0 ≤ q
0.




 ∈ S0 and to conclude that the inequalities are strict, i.e., q
f




















lay on GR r0 (.) and given the contradiction hypothesis that q
f
1 < q1,







0 because any selection of r0 (.) is strictly decreasing.
27This completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 13. To prove this result we need to show that both ﬁrms prefer the































lay on GR r0 (q1). Then, as in proof of Lemma 18, we can apply the Envelope


























where the latter inequality comes from the property of Stackelberg equilibria, and it is
strict by the result in point (i) of the proof of Lemma 17.































where the ﬁrst inequality comes from the fact that q
f
1 is best response to ql
0 and the
second is due to the private ﬁrm’s objective being strictly decreasing in q0.
The conditions of point (ii) of Proposition 3 hold and both Stackelberg equilibria are SPE
of the endogenous timing game.
Proof of Theorem 14. by Point (b) in Lemma 5 any selection of the best response
correspondence r1 (q0) is strictly increasing in the interior. By point (a) of Lemma 9 r1 (q0)
is single valued and continuous. Since C0 is convex, r0 (q1) is single valued, continuous, and






As in the proof of Theorem 11, we now prove that: (i) the public ﬁrm is better oﬀ in the private
leadership than in the mixed-duopoly Cournot equilibrium; while (ii) the private ﬁrm’s payoﬀ
is strictly larger in the Cournot than in the public leadership equilibrium.
(i) For the private leadership equilibrium, since r0 is strictly decreasing in the interior, we
can apply the same analysis as in point (i) in Theorem 13 to show that from inequality





















∈ S0 is such that ql
0 > q0 and q
f
1 > q1. Supposeby contradiction
that ql











































lay on GR r0 (.) with qF

























































where the ﬁrst inequality comes from q1 being a best response to q
0, and the second is



























< Wd  
q0,q1
￿
which contradicts the nature of Stackelberg equilibrium. Therefore it must be that
ql
0 ≥ q0 and q
f
1 ≥ q1. Moreover, we can apply the result in point (ii) of the proof of





 ∈ S0 and to conclude that the inequalities are strict.







∈ S0 is such that ql





















where the ﬁrst inequality follows from the property of Cournot equilibria and the second
from the fact that Π1 is strictly decreasing in q0. Then, the private ﬁrm strictly prefers
Cournot to public leadership equilibria.
Therefore the conditions of point iii) of Proposition 3 hold and the private leadership
equilibrium is the unique SPE of the endogenous timing game.
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